COMMENT
Righting Categorical Wrongs: A Holistic
Solution to Rule 8(a)’s Same-or-SimilarCharacter Prong
Matthew Deates†
More than half of federal criminal defendants are charged with multiple offenses in a single indictment. These defendants are more likely to be convicted on
at least one charge than defendants who receive separate trials for each charge.
Joinder has been both lauded for increasing the efficiency of the federal criminal
justice system and criticized for unfairly prejudicing criminal defendants. Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(a) and 14 govern the joinder of offenses in the federal system. Rule 8(a) permits offenses of the “same or similar character” to be
joined against a single defendant while Rule 14 allows district courts to sever the
offenses if joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant.” The circuit courts have taken
divergent views of when offenses are of the “same or similar character” and thus
properly joined together. Two general approaches have emerged among the circuits, with roughly half taking a categorical approach to Rule 8(a)’s same-orsimilar-character prong, which requires offenses to be simply of “like class.” The
remaining circuits, on the other hand, employ a holistic approach. These courts
apply multifactored tests to examine the charges for similarity, including whether
the offenses are connected by time or evidence and involve similar statutory elements or victims. The holistic approach’s more rigorous analysis under the sameor-similar-character prong results in fewer combinations of offenses joined.
This Comment resolves the circuit split over the same-or-similar-character
prong by examining the history, functions, and purposes of Rules 8(a) and 14. It
argues that the holistic approach is superior to the categorical, as it better fulfills
the intent of the rules’ drafters, better accounts for the procedural and practical realities of the rules, and better meets joinder’s efficiency goals while minimizing its
risk of prejudice.
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INTRODUCTION
A criminal defendant is charged with wire fraud in violation
of 18 USC § 1343. As he and his defense attorney prepare for
trial, the US Attorney’s Office notifies him that there is reason
to believe he has previously committed bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 USC § 152. The prosecution joins the two charges in
a single superseding indictment. The alleged crimes occurred
three years apart in different cities, under different circumstances, and involved different victims; in fact, they arise from
distinct statutory provisions and must be proved by different elements. Despite their striking dissimilarity, the defendant may
be forced to defend against the two charges in a single criminal
proceeding.
Rules 8(a) and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (FRCrP) govern the joinder of offenses. One prong of
Rule 8(a) authorizes the joinder of two or more charges in a single indictment if they are of the “same or similar character.”1
What it means for offenses to be of the “same or similar character” has divided the US courts of appeals. If the criminal defendant is charged in a circuit that uses a strictly categorical
approach, which requires that offenses only be of “like class,”
then factually dissimilar offenses, as in the example above, may
be charged together.2 By contrast, if the criminal defendant is
1

See FRCrP 8(a).
See, for example, United States v Coleman, 22 F3d 126, 133 (7th Cir 1994)
(“Simply put, if offenses are of like class, although not connected temporally or evidentially, the requisites of proper joinder should be satisfied so far as Rule 8(a) is
concerned.”).
2
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charged in a circuit with a holistic approach to Rule 8(a)’s sameor-similar-character prong, the government must show that the
alleged offenses are more than just of “like class.” These circuits
rely on additional considerations to determine whether offenses
are of the “same or similar character,” including any evidentiary
and temporal overlap between the two offenses, or whether the
offenses are proven by analogous statutory elements, share a
modus operandi, occurred in similar locations, or involve similar
victims.3 All else equal, the holistic-approach circuits undertake
a more fact-intensive analysis into whether offenses are of the
“same or similar character,” which results in fewer combinations
of offenses joined than under the categorical approach.4
Given that joinder may substantially and unfairly prejudice
defendants, the circuit split on the same-or-similar-character
prong is troubling.5 In a joint trial on separate offenses, the jury
may struggle to separate the bodies of evidence relating to different crimes and may draw impermissible inferences about the
defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit crime. The
defendant also may be burdened with having to present multiple—and perhaps inconsistent—defenses at once.6 Furthermore,
defendants facing multiple charges are significantly more likely
to be convicted on at least one count at trial than defendants facing only one charge.7
The circuit split over Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character
prong is also concerning in light of joinder’s rationale: increasing
judicial and prosecutorial efficiency.8 Joinder is often thought to
be more efficient because a single trial on multiple offenses eliminates the need to empanel two juries, recall witnesses, and

3
See, for example, United States v Jawara, 462 F3d 1173, 1185 (9th Cir 2006),
amended, 474 F3d 565, 578 (9th Cir 2007).
4
See Part II.C.
5
See, for example, Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172, 180 (1997) (“The term
‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly
relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from
proof specific to the offense charged.”).
6
See Wayne R. LaFave, et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 17.1(b) at 6–10 (West
4th ed 2015).
7
See Andrew D. Leipold and Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and
Severance on Federal Criminal Cases: An Empirical Study, 59 Vand L Rev 349, 367
(2006); James Farrin, Note, Rethinking Criminal Joinder: An Analysis of the Empirical
Research and Its Implications for Justice, 52 L & Contemp Probs 325, 332 (Autumn
1989) (“The empirical data unequivocally show that the probability of a defendant being
convicted significantly increases if offenses are joined rather than tried separately.”).
8
See Bruton v United States, 391 US 123, 134 (1968).
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spend time presenting the same evidence twice.9 In practice,
however, these benefits are often not fully realized in cases in
which offenses are categorically joined under the same-orsimilar-character prong. In particular, offenses joined merely
because they are of “like class” may be proved with completely
separate evidence and witnesses, invalidating much of joinder’s
efficiency justification. And the increased threat of prejudice under these circumstances may outweigh any legitimate purpose
for the joinder. Holistic-approach circuits, on the other hand,
better achieve efficient joinder by requiring that offenses be
more closely connected, whether by evidence, time, statutory elements, or modus operandi. And when joined offenses are more
closely connected, the prejudices resulting from joinder are more
likely justified by the efficiency gains in holding a single trial.
Regardless of the court’s approach to Rule 8(a), a defendant
facing multiple charges may make an application under Rule 14
to sever the charges into separate criminal proceedings.10 To obtain Rule 14 severance, the defendant must show that joinder
would cause him prejudice.11 If he meets this requirement,
Rule 14 allows district courts to sever charges properly joined
under Rule 8(a). As a result, the categorical-approach courts believe the availability of Rule 14 severance reinforces their more
permissive interpretation of Rule 8(a).12
But this belief may not be rooted in the realities of Rule 14
severance. The procedural and practical attributes of Rule 14
make it an uncertain remedy against joinder’s prejudice. Not only do district-court judges enjoy significant discretion in deciding
whether there is enough prejudice to warrant severance, but
even if such prejudice exists, judges may choose alternative
remedies to severance, such as instructing the jury to not use evidence of one charge to convict on the other.13 The holisticapproach courts, on the other hand, acknowledge Rule 14’s

9

See id.
See FRCrP 14(a) (“If the joinder of offenses . . . appears to prejudice a defendant
. . . the court may order separate trials of counts.”).
11 See FRCrP 14(a).
12 See, for example, Coleman, 22 F3d at 134 (explaining that a categorical approach
to the same-or-similar-character prong “makes sense” in light of Rule 14’s authority “for
monitoring the continued appropriateness of a joint trial as proceedings go forward”).
13 See id at 134 n 11 (noting that Rule 14 authorizes courts to provide “whatever
other relief justice requires”).
10
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inherent limitations and understand that severance may not be
available even in the face of joinder’s prejudice.14
This Comment analyzes the current circuit split on when
two or more offenses are of the “same or similar character” under Rule 8(a). Part I provides background on joinder of offenses
in the federal system, its controversial nature, and its effect on
criminal trials. Part I also discusses the federal rules that govern joinder and severance—their origin and their application
today. Part II outlines the variety of approaches taken by the
circuit courts to joinder under Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similarcharacter prong and examines the underlying motivations and
assumptions driving the two most disparate approaches: those of
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. It also compares how these two
circuits and their respective district courts have subsequently
treated joinder under the same-or-similar-character prong, and
it questions whether their approaches adequately address the
danger of prejudice that is unjustified by any potential efficiency
gains. Finally, Part III offers a solution to the circuit split, arguing that courts should abandon the categorical approach in favor
of the holistic. The categorical-approach courts have failed to
comply with the original understanding of the federal rules on
joinder because their approach leads to additional unjustified
and unfair prejudice toward defendants. The holistic approach,
in contrast, more fully embodies the principles incorporated into the federal rules and adequately tempers the risks of prejudice while allowing offenses to be joined when efficiencies can
be attained.
I. JOINDER OF OFFENSES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Joinder of offenses is a contentious mechanism in the federal criminal justice system, justified primarily by the judicial and
prosecutorial efficiencies it can afford. Having a single trial on
multiple charges saves limited time and resources. Yet joinder
may pose a substantial risk of unfair prejudice toward defendants. Courts applying the rules on joinder have struggled to ensure that joinder’s efficiency benefits can be realized while minimizing its risk of unfair prejudice.

14 See, for example, Jawara, 474 F3d at 573 (adopting a holistic approach to the
same-or-similar-character prong and cautioning that “Rule 14 should not be viewed as a
backstop or substitute for the initial analysis required under Rule 8(a)”).
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Part I.A discusses the benefits and costs of joinder in federal
prosecutions and highlights the general controversy surrounding
its use. Part I.B introduces the federal rules governing joinder of
offenses and explains these rules’ origins before focusing on the
most controversial basis for joinder: Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similarcharacter prong.
A.

Joinder’s Controversy

Joinder has been lauded for fostering trial efficiency and judicial and prosecutorial economy by avoiding “expensive and
duplicative multiple trials.”15 The Supreme Court has heralded
joinder’s ability to “conserve [government] funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.”16 Under some
circumstances, the criminal defendant himself may prefer joinder to avoid the “harassment, delay, trauma, and expense of
multiple prosecutions.”17 A single prosecution of multiple offenses also may allow for concurrent sentencing.18
Despite these advantages, joint trials present significant
risks of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Rather than properly
weighing the evidence for each charge, the jury may convict
based on the accumulation of evidence specific to each charge or
on the impermissible inference of a general criminal disposition.19 Joinder may also disadvantage defendants who wish to
testify regarding one charge but not the other or who need to
simultaneously present multiple—and perhaps inconsistent—
defenses.20

15 United States v Coleman, 22 F3d 126, 132 (7th Cir 1994), citing United States v
Archer, 843 F2d 1019, 1021 (7th Cir 1988), and United States v L’Allier, 838 F2d 234,
240 (7th Cir 1988). See also United States v Werner, 620 F2d 922, 928–29 (2d Cir 1980);
Robert O. Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of
Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 Mich L Rev 1379, 1381–97 (1979).
16 Bruton v United States, 391 US 123, 134 (1968).
17 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Commentary on § 13-2.1 (ABA 2d ed 1980).
18 See 18 USC § 3584 (“If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time . . . the terms may run concurrently.”). See also United States v
Matera, 489 F3d 115, 124 (2d Cir 2007) (explaining that § 3584 grants the district-court
judge “discretion to impose a concurrent, partially concurrent, or consecutive sentence”).
19 See Coleman, 22 F3d at 132, citing Drew v United States, 331 F2d 85, 88 (DC Cir
1964). See also United States v Lane, 474 US 438, 463 (1986) (Brennan concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that it is “quite easy for the jury to be prejudiced by evidence of other crimes”).
20 See LaFave, et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 17.1(b) at 9 (cited in note 6).
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Joinder is a common tactic in the federal system: a study of
all federal criminal defendants from 1999 through 2003 found
that slightly more than half were charged with two or more offenses in a single indictment.21 Strikingly, the study found a
nine-point disparity in trial conviction rates of those charged
with single and joined offenses: the conviction rate for defendants charged with one offense was 76 percent, whereas the conviction rate for defendants with joined offenses was 85 percent.22
Though the study did not examine the precise cause for this significant discrepancy, it is likely that jury confusion regarding
the evidence on separate but similar charges and prejudice resulting from the sheer volume of evidence against the defendants played a role.23 For example, the jury might “be so impressed with the evidence on counts one and two that it fails to
notice that there was insufficient evidence on the very-similar
count three.”24
B.

The Rules Governing Joinder of Offenses

Rules 8(a) and 14 of the FRCrP govern the joinder of offenses in the federal system. Adopted in 1944, the rules derive from
the 1853 federal statute that had previously controlled joinder.25
The drafters of Rules 8(a) and 14 explained that the rules are a
“restatement” of the 1853 statute.26 Consequently, an understanding of this statute and its application is essential to applying the current rules. Part I.B.1 explains the law that governed
federal joinder prior to the adoption of Rules 8(a) and 14.
Part I.B.2 discusses how joinder operates today under the rules.

21

See Leipold and Abbasi, 59 Vand L Rev at 363–64 (cited in note 7).
Id at 383. The authors controlled for whether the factfinder was a judge or the
jury, the seriousness of the crime, the type of crime, the type of lawyer, and the geography. See id at 373–83.
23 See id at 355–56.
24 Id at 356.
25 See Act of Feb 26, 1853, 10 Stat 161, 162, codified at 18 USC § 557 (1940), repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat 683, 830, 832. See also Kevin P. Hein, Joinder
and Severance, 30 Am Crim L Rev 1139, 1140 (1993).
26 See FRCrP 8(a), Advisory Committee Note to the 1944 Rule (“This rule is substantially a restatement of existing law, 18 U.S.C. [former] 557.”) (alteration in original);
FRCrP 14, Advisory Committee Note to the 1944 Rule (“This rule is a restatement of existing law under which severance and other similar relief is entirely in the discretion of
the court.”), citing generally Pointer v United States, 151 US 396 (1894), Pierce v United
States, 160 US 355 (1896), United States v Ball, 163 US 662 (1896), and Stilson v United
States, 250 US 583 (1919).
22
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1. Joinder law before 1944.
Before the adoption of Rules 8(a) and 14 in 1944, a federal
statute permitted the joinder of offenses in federal prosecutions.27 When the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the
statute, it recognized the controversial nature of joinder and its
significant risks of prejudice toward criminal defendants. The
Court articulated a general presumption against the joinder of
offenses and established that courts should not sustain instances of joinder that are unfairly prejudicial toward the defendant.
To minimize the risk of prejudice, the Court held that the former
joinder statute did not permit the government to join wholly unrelated offenses sharing no significant connection. That statute,
originally passed in 1853, provided in part:
Whenever there are . . . several charges against any person
. . . for the same act or transaction, or for two or more acts
or transactions connected together, or for two or more acts
or transactions of the same class of crimes or offences which
may be properly joined, instead of having several indictments, the whole may be joined in one indictment in separate counts.28
Though the statute seemed to broadly allow charges “of the
same class of crimes or offences” joined in one indictment, the
Court required a close factual and evidentiary connection between the alleged crimes. When it first examined the federal
joinder statute in Pointer v United States,29 the Court considered
whether it allowed the Government to join two murder charges
against a single defendant. The Government alleged the defendant had killed two people “on the same day, in the same county
and district, and with the same kind of instrument.”30 But because the alleged murders were entirely separate acts, the Court
first concluded that the charges were neither “the result of one
transaction” nor “connected together” within the meaning of the
statute.31

27

Act of Feb 26, 1853, 10 Stat at 162.
Act of Feb 26, 1853, 10 Stat at 162. Rule 8(a)’s drafters largely preserved this
structure, allowing joinder when the offenses are “based on the same act or transaction,”
are “connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan,” or are of the “same
or similar character.” FRCrP 8(a).
29 151 US 396 (1894).
30 Id at 403.
31 Id at 400.
28
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The Pointer Court next considered whether the two charges
could be joined under the statute as being of “the same class of
crimes.”32 It explained that, rather than mandating joinder in
every case in which offenses are of “the same class,” the 1853
statute allowed courts “to determine whether, in a given case, a
joinder of two or more offences . . . is consistent with the settled
principles of criminal law.”33 The Court looked to English and
American sources for recognition of certain “settled principles”
to guide courts’ joinder analyses and noted a general presumption against joinder: “[U]sually an indictment should not include
more than one felony.”34 That said, the Court conceded joinder
“of different felonies, at least of the same class or grade, and
subject to the same punishment, is not necessarily fatal to the
indictment.”35 Yet even when joinder is allowed, courts “must not
permit the defendant to be embarrassed in his defence.”36 Courts
should sever charges “when it appears from the indictment, or
from the evidence,” that the “substantial rights of the accused
may be prejudiced” by joinder.37
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court noted that the
two murders were so closely related “in respect of time, place,
and occasion, that it was difficult, if not impossible, to separate
the proof of one charge from the proof of the other.”38 Thus, the
Court decided the settled principles of criminal law allowed
joinder: “the accused was not confounded in his defense” and
“his substantial rights were not prejudiced” by joinder of the
charges.39
Shortly after deciding Pointer, the Court further refined its
understanding of the 1853 joinder statute in McElroy v United
States.40 The prosecution in McElroy charged the defendant with
two counts of assault with intent to kill and two counts of arson,
which derived from two separate incidents two weeks apart.41
Echoing Pointer, the Court explained that joinder “has been considered so objectionable as tending to confound the accused in

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id.
Pointer, 151 US at 400.
Id at 403.
Id.
Id.
Pointer, 151 US at 403.
Id at 404.
Id.
164 US 76 (1896).
Id at 76–77.
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his defence”42 and concluded that “we do not think the statute
authorizes the joinder of distinct felonies, not provable by the
same evidence and in no sense resulting from the same series of
acts.”43
Reaching the merits of the case, the Court found the offenses could not be joined under the statute; the offenses were “separate and distinct, complete in themselves and independent of
each other, committed at different times and not provable by the
same evidence.”44 Although the charges were “of the same class
of crimes,”45 the Court required a close temporal, factual, and evidentiary connection before allowing joinder. After McElroy, the
federal courts followed this lead.46
2. FRCrP 8(a) and 14.
Since 1944, FRCrP 8(a) and 14 have regulated the joinder of
federal offenses. As these rules restate the previous law on joinder, the principles announced in Pointer and McElroy should
continue to inform their application today. Indeed, courts relied
on these decisions when applying Rules 8(a) and 14 shortly after
their adoption.47
Rule 8(a) allows for the joinder of multiple offenses—
“whether felonies or misdemeanors or both”—against an individual defendant if one of three conditions is satisfied: the offenses charged must be either (1) “of the same or similar character,” (2) “based on the same act or transaction,” or (3) “connected

42

Id at 80.
Id.
44 McElroy, 164 US at 79–80.
45 Id at 80.
46 See, for example, Williams v United States, 168 US 382, 390–91 (1897) (holding
that the 1853 statute permitted the joinder of two separate extortion charges because
“the offenses charged were of the same kind, were provable by the same kind of evidence,
and could be tried together without embarrassing the accused in making his defense”);
Kidwell v United States, 38 App DC 566, 570 (1912) (holding that the Government had
misjoined two charges of carnal knowledge that stemmed from separate incidents more
than six months apart and were not dependent on the same evidence).
47 See, for example, United States v Graci, 504 F2d 411, 413 (3d Cir 1974) (“The
Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rule[ ] 8 . . . indicate that [it is] substantially [a]
restatement[ ] of existing law. Thus the construction . . . announced in McElroy . . . still
applies.”); United States v Schennault, 201 F2d 1, 4 (7th Cir 1952) (“As the advisory
committee on rules pointed out, rules 8 and 14 [ ] are mere restatements of existing law,
and owe their origin to the Act of February 26, 1853. . . . Hence it is altogether proper in
discussing these rules to cite cases decided under said statute.”). See also King v United
States, 355 F2d 700, 703 (1st Cir 1966); Drew, 331 F2d at 88–89.
43
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with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.”48 These
three prongs are similar to the language of the former federal
joinder statute.49
Even if the offenses are properly joined under Rule 8(a), the
trial judge may sever the charges and order separate trials pursuant to Rule 14, which provides: “If the joinder of offenses . . .
appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court
may order separate trials of counts . . . or provide any other relief justice requires.”50
a) Rule 8(a). Whether joinder is proper under Rule 8(a) is
a question of law decided by the district-court judge during the
case’s pretrial proceedings.51 Defendants charged with multiple
offenses in a single indictment may bring motions to sever pursuant to Rule 8(a), arguing that none of the rule’s three bases for
joinder applies. The district-court judge must make the Rule 8(a)
determination solely from information provided by the
Government in the indictment.52 It is therefore incumbent upon
the prosecution to ensure that the indictment alleges sufficient
facts for the judge to find joinder proper. If offenses are misjoined under Rule 8(a), such that none of the three prongs applies, the offenses must be severed as a matter of law. Whether
offenses are properly joined under Rule 8(a) is reviewed de novo
by the appellate courts.53
Of Rule 8(a)’s three bases for joinder, the same-or-similarcharacter prong is the most amorphous and controversial.54 According to Professor Lester Orfield, the drafters of Rule 8(a) substituted “character” for the word “class” (which was used in the
1853 joinder statute) because some courts had interpreted
“class” to mean “grade” rather than “nature.”55 Presumably the

48

FRCrP 8(a).
See text accompanying note 27.
50 FRCrP 14(a).
51 See Coleman, 22 F3d at 134; United States v Jawara, 462 F3d 1173, 1179 (9th
Cir 2006), amended, 474 F3d 565, 572–73 (9th Cir 2007) (explaining that the validity of
joinder under Rule 8(a) is “discern[ed] from the face of the indictment”), citing United
States v Terry, 911 F2d 272, 276–77 (9th Cir 1990).
52 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 572, quoting Terry, 911 F2d at 276; United States v
Barsoum, 763 F3d 1321, 1337 (11th Cir 2014); United States v Berg, 714 F3d 490, 495
(7th Cir 2013), quoting United States v Lanas, 324 F3d 894, 899 (7th Cir 2003).
53 See United States v Gooch, 665 F3d 1318, 1325 (DC Cir 2012); Jawara, 474 F3d
at 572, citing Terry, 911 F2d at 276.
54 See Charles A. Wright, et al, 1A Federal Practice and Procedure § 143 at 52–53
(West 2016); Hein, 30 Am Crim L Rev at 1140 n 8 (cited in note 25).
55 See Lester B. Orfield, Joinder in Federal Criminal Procedure, 26 FRD 23, 27 (1961).
49
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drafters wanted courts to focus on the factual circumstances of
each offense rather than their degree or grading as either misdemeanor or felony. Despite this change, courts have struggled
to determine what it means for offenses to be of the “same or
similar character.” In these cases, “line drawing between permissible and improper joinder sometimes becomes imprecise and
the standards applied confusing.”56
In addition to being vague, the same-or-similar-character
prong may fail to advance joinder’s efficiency justifications while
elevating “the risk of unnecessary unfairness infiltrating the
joint trial.”57 Strong evidence of one crime may cause the jury to
accept weaker evidence of similar crimes, violating the spirit of
the rule forbidding character or propensity evidence.58 And unlike joinder under Rule 8(a)’s other two prongs, offenses of the
“same or similar character” might “involve different times, separate locations, and distinct sets of witnesses and victims.”59 Consequently, there might be “no comparable saving of trial time”60
as “separate trials would not involve substantial duplication of
evidence, repeated burdens on witnesses and victims, and increased drain upon prosecutorial and judicial resources.”61
b) Rule 14. Unlike Rule 8(a), Rule 14 allows courts to
sever offenses at any time during criminal proceedings if joinder
appears to prejudice the defendant or government.62 Under
Rule 14, the trial judge may even sever offenses properly joined

56

United States v Buchanan, 930 F Supp 657, 662 (D Mass 1996).
Coleman, 22 F3d at 134. See also United States v Muniz, 1 F3d 1018, 1023
(10th Cir 1993).
58 See FRE 404(b)(1).
59 LaFave, et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 17.1(b) at 9 (cited in note 6).
60 Coleman, 22 F3d at 134, quoting James W. Moore, 8 Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 8.05[4] at 8-23 to -24 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 1991).
61 LaFave, et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 17.1(b) at 9 (cited in note 6), quoting 2
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Commentary on § 13-2.1 (cited in note 17). See also
United States v Randazzo, 80 F3d 623, 627 (1st Cir 1996) (“It is obvious why Congress
provided for joinder of counts that grow out of related transactions . . . the reason for allowing joinder of offenses having ‘the same or similar character’ is less clear.”); United
States v Halper, 590 F2d 422, 430 (2d Cir 1978) (“When all that can be said of two separate offenses is that they are of the ‘same or similar character,’ the customary justifications for joinder (efficiency and economy) largely disappear. . . . At the same time, the
risk to the defendant in such circumstances is considerable.”); Note, Joint and Single
Trials under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 Yale L J 553,
560 (1965) (recommending “abolition of joinder of similar offenses under Rule 8” given
the “lack of utility” and risk of prejudice to the defendant).
62 See Schaffer v United States, 362 US 511, 516 (1960) (“[T]he trial judge has a
continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear.”).
57
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under Rule 8(a).63 The Rule 14 severance decision is not confined
to the indictment’s contents; the trial judge may rely on any information, including evidence presented at trial, when deciding
whether to sever charges under the rule.64
Rule 14 is important for its potential to resolve whatever
prejudices might arise from Rule 8(a) joinder. Once Rule 8(a)’s
requirements for joinder are satisfied, severance is entirely controlled by Rule 14.65 Some courts have construed Rule 8(a) more
leniently, knowing that any prejudice stemming from joinder
can theoretically be dealt with at a later time on a Rule 14 severance motion.66
Yet there are several reasons that, compared to the
Rule 8(a) analysis, Rule 14 is a weak safeguard against unfair
prejudice. For starters, obtaining severance under Rule 14 is often difficult. Courts generally require defendants to show a
high degree of prejudice before severing charges under the
rule.67 The Seventh Circuit, for example, requires defendants
seeking Rule 14 severance to establish that they “could not
have a fair trial without severance.”68 Likewise, district courts
in the Fifth Circuit will grant severance only in cases of “compelling prejudice.”69
Even if the defendant meets this heavy burden, Rule 14
does not mandate severance; instead, “it leaves the tailoring of
the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s sound discretion.”70 Rather than ordering separate trials in the face of
substantial prejudice, a trial judge could choose to simply instruct the jury on the dangers of confusing the evidence relating
to the separate charges. And unlike a district court’s Rule 8(a)
decision, which is reviewed de novo, appellate courts defer to a
district court’s Rule 14 decision and will reverse only if there is a

63

See id at 515–16.
See id.
65 See, for example, Lane, 474 US at 447, citing Schaffer, 362 US at 515–16.
66 See, for example, Randazzo, 80 F3d at 627 (“Rule 8(a)’s joinder provision is generously construed in favor of joinder . . . in part because [Rule] 14 provides a separate
layer of protection where it is most needed.”); Coleman, 22 F3d at 134.
67 See Zafiro v United States, 506 US 534, 539 (1993) (“When the risk of prejudice
is high, a district court is more likely to determine that separate trials are necessary.”).
68 United States v Hughes, 310 F3d 557, 563 (7th Cir 2002), quoting United States v
Mohammad, 53 F3d 1426, 1431 (7th Cir 1995).
69 United States v Rice, 607 F3d 133, 142 (5th Cir 2010).
70 Zafiro, 506 US at 538–39, citing Lane, 474 US at 438, 449 n 12. See also Opper v
United States, 348 US 84, 95 (1954).
64
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clear abuse of discretion.71 For example, to successfully appeal a
district court’s denial of Rule 14 severance in the Seventh
Circuit, “the defendant bears an extremely difficult burden of
showing . . . that the district court abused its discretion.”72 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit will not reverse a district court’s Rule 14
decision unless the defendant shows that “a joint trial was so
manifestly prejudicial as to require the trial judge to exercise his
discretion in but one way, by ordering a separate trial.”73 The
Second Circuit has put it more bluntly: “A district court’s decision to deny severance is virtually unreviewable and will be
overturned only if a defendant can demonstrate prejudice so
severe that his conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice
and that the denial of his motion constituted an abuse of discretion.”74 Consequently, a district court’s severance decision
under Rule 14 is far less likely to be reversed than its Rule 8(a)
decision.
Besides Rule 14’s exacting severance standards and deferential appellate review, certain practicalities make it difficult to
obtain separate trials on joined offenses. As James Farrin notes,
“there is never a good time to claim unfair joinder. Before trial,
such a claim may seem speculative, during the trial, disruptive,
and after the trial, harmless error.”75 The fallacy of sunk costs76
may explain the hesitancy of district-court judges to sever offenses in the middle of trial, even if it is clear the defendant is
substantially prejudiced by the joinder, having already invested
time and resources into a lengthy criminal proceeding, including
indictment, filing of pretrial motions, jury selection, and evidence presentment. This is unfortunate, as Rule 14 plainly allows for severance in the face of prejudice arising at any point in

71 See Lane, 474 US at 449 n 12 (“Rule 14’s concern is to provide the trial court
with some flexibility when a joint trial may appear to risk prejudice to a party; review of
that decision is for an abuse of discretion.”).
72 United States v Moya-Gomez, 860 F2d 706, 754 (7th Cir 1988) (emphasis added).
This is the standard that the Seventh Circuit applied before its decision in Coleman,
which relaxed the standard. See text accompanying notes 98–99.
73 United States v Sullivan, 522 F3d 967, 981 (9th Cir 2008) (quotation marks
omitted).
74 United States v Fazio, 770 F3d 160, 165–66 (2d Cir 2014) (emphasis added and
quotation marks omitted).
75 Farrin, Note, 52 L & Contemp Probs at 334 (cited in note 7). See also Dawson, 77
Mich L Rev at 1410 (cited in note 15).
76 For a discussion of sunk-cost effects on decisionmaking, see generally Ross
B. Steinman and Emily Jacobs, Sunk Cost Effects on Consumer Choice, 4 Bus Mgmt
Dynamics 25 (May 2015).
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the criminal proceeding—even during trial. This, together with
the great burden that district courts impose on defendants seeking severance under Rule 14 and the discrepancy in appellate
review, renders Rule 14 a shaky defense against joinder’s risks.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHEN ARE TWO OR MORE OFFENSES OF THE
“SAME OR SIMILAR CHARACTER” TO BE JOINED UNDER RULE 8(A)?
Given the controversial nature of joinder in general and
Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong in particular, it is
especially troubling that for several decades the circuit courts
have adopted disparate approaches to determine whether offenses are of the “same or similar character” and, therefore,
properly joined under Rule 8(a). Two general approaches have
developed: one categorical and one holistic. Part II.A examines
the categorical approach while Part II.B discusses the holistic.
Part II.C compares how these distinct approaches to the sameor-similar-character prong work in practice. Part II.D then considers how courts operating under the two regimes treat severance under Rule 14 and questions whether their treatment
accounts for joinder’s danger of unjustified prejudice.
A.

The Categorical Approach

Though not identical in form, the Second,77 Seventh,78 and
Eleventh79 Circuits take a categorical view of Rule 8(a)’s sameor-similar-character prong. These circuits permit more combinations of offenses to be joined in one indictment, even without evidentiary or temporal connections between the charges.80 These
courts share a broad understanding of when offenses are of the

77 See, for example, United States v Werner, 620 F2d 922, 926 (2d Cir 1980) (deciding that “Rule 8(a) is not limited to crimes of the ‘same’ character but also covers those of
‘similar’ character, which means ‘[n]early corresponding; resembling in many respects;
somewhat alike; having a general likeness’”) (alteration in original); United States v
Rivera, 546 F3d 245, 253 (2d Cir 2008) (expounding on Werner and holding that
“[s]imilar” charges include those that are “somewhat alike,” or share “a general likeness”).
78 See, for example, United States v Coleman, 22 F3d 126, 134 (7th Cir 1994).
79 See, for example, United States v Hersh, 297 F3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir 2002)
(holding that the same-or-similar-character prong requires only that “the offenses . . . be
similar in category, not in evidence”).
80 See Part II.C.
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“same or similar character” and, depending on the degree of
generality, may join seemingly unrelated offenses.81
The Seventh Circuit’s landmark decision in United States v
Coleman82 most fully articulated the categorical approach to
Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong and provided numerous arguments against the holistic alternative. In that case,
the Government charged the defendant with four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 USC § 922(g)(1).83
Although the counts stemmed from four separate incidents occurring in separate locations over a span greater than two
years,84 the court found them properly joined under the same-orsimilar-character prong.85
The Coleman court concluded: “[I]f offenses are of like class,
although not connected temporally or evidentially, the requisites
of proper joinder should be satisfied so far as Rule 8(a) is concerned.”86 The rule’s plain language, the court reasoned, serves
as a “clear directive to compare the offenses charged for categorical, not evidentiary, similarities.”87 Requiring that offenses be of
“like class” does not mean that they derive from the same statute, either.88 Rather, their “correspondence in type is obviously
central to their proper joinder.”89 Similarity of character also
“does not significantly depend on [the] separation in time” between two offenses: “Two armored car robberies committed

81 The Ninth Circuit has criticized the holistic approach as allowing joinder when
some “general thematic commonality” among the charges can be adduced. See United
States v Jawara, 462 F3d 1173, 1185 (9th Cir 2006), amended, 474 F3d 565, 579 (9th Cir
2007). For example, the situation of “a pharmacist who sells, over the counter, unlawful
amounts of products containing pseudoephedrine and then, some years later, buys cocaine from a government informant” involves a common theme of drugs, yet that might
not make the offenses of the “same or similar character” under Rule 8(a). Id.
82 22 F3d 126 (7th Cir 1994).
83 Id at 128.
84 Id.
85 See id at 134.
86 Coleman, 22 F3d at 133.
87 Id at 133 (refuting the Eighth Circuit’s emphasis on both evidentiary similarities
and time separation).
88 Id at 133 n 10.
89 Id, citing Werner, 620 F2d at 926–27. The Coleman court did not provide much
detail on its understanding of “like class” or “correspondence in type.” But it relied on
Second Circuit precedent for its categorical approach, which in turn pointed to a dictionary definition of “similar” to guide an interpretation of the same-or-similar-character
prong: “Nearly corresponding; resembling in many respects; somewhat alike; having a
general likeness.” Werner, 620 F2d at 926 (alteration omitted). However, it is doubtful
whether this definition provides much clarity to lower courts deciding whether two offenses are of like class.

2018]

Righting Categorical Wrongs

843

months apart are offenses of same or similar character; possessing five kilograms of cocaine and defrauding a bank, even if
they occur on the same day, are not.”90
The Coleman court recognized the dangers inherent in its
new categorical approach. Compared to joined offenses arising
from “a common scheme or plan” or “the same act or transaction,”91 “[t]here is no comparable saving of trial time when offenses . . . related only by being of the same type are joined,
since the offenses are usually proven by different bodies of evidence.”92 Moreover, “when totally unrelated, similar offenses are
joined, [the] defendant faces a ‘considerable risk’ of prejudice”
that arises from “possible jury confusion [or] illegitimate cumulation of evidence.”93
Nevertheless, the Coleman court cited the respective roles of
Rules 8(a) and 14 to justify its categorical approach. Because the
district court’s joinder decision under Rule 8(a) is based solely on
the face of the indictment and made at the start of the criminal
proceeding, an “uncomplicated inquiry and review” is necessary.94 At that early juncture, Coleman explained, the extent of
evidentiary or temporal overlap between the alleged offenses
might not be entirely clear, which supports a broad construction
of the same-or-similar-character prong.95 Besides, any concerns
about the unfairness created by a permissive reading of
Rule 8(a) could be mitigated by later opportunities for severance
under Rule 14, which provides flexible authority “for monitoring
the continued appropriateness of a joint trial as proceedings go
forward.”96 On a motion to sever under Rule 14, the districtcourt judge may be in a better position to examine “the nature of
the evidence and ties between the acts underlying the offenses
charged,” and more easily weigh the “actual risk of unfair prejudice that a joint trial would entail.”97
To compensate for its highly inclusive same-or-similarcharacter test, the Coleman court refined its standards for
Rule 14 severance. Departing from the “extremely difficult burden” traditionally imposed on defendants to show substantial
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Coleman, 22 F3d at 133.
FRCrP 8(a).
Coleman, 22 F3d at 133–34 & n 9.
Id at 134.
Id.
See id at 134.
Coleman, 22 F3d at 134.
Id.
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prejudice,98 Coleman directed that district-court judges “must
not shirk their duties under Rule 14”: they must “vigilantly
monitor for developing unfairness” and “not hesitate to order
severance at any point . . . if the risk of real prejudice grows too
large to justify whatever efficiencies a joint trial does provide.”99
The court recognized that, from the start, this balancing might
weigh in favor of severance when offenses of the “same or similar character” are joined. To head off such cases, the court implored district courts to be “especially watchful” for the development of prejudice against the defendant, including “jury
confusion, illegitimate cumulation of evidence or other sources of
prejudice not worth the reduced efficiency gains of a joint trial.”100 Finally, Coleman emphasized that trial courts have discretion to sever under Rule 14, “not to signal any general disapproval of severance,” but rather to reflect the district court’s
unique vantage point at trial.101 At the same time, the Seventh
Circuit observed that most Rule 14 decisions that it reviews are
denials to sever, suggesting that courts rarely take advantage of
their Rule 14 discretion.102
B.

The Holistic Approach

The First,103 Third,104 Fourth,105 Fifth,106 Eighth,107 and
Ninth108 Circuits employ a holistic approach to Rule 8(a)’s
98

United States v Moya-Gomez, 860 F2d 706, 754 (7th Cir 1988).
Coleman, 22 F3d at 134. At least one other categorical circuit employs a comparable balancing test when defendants seek to sever offenses of the “same or similar character” under Rule 14. See United States v Page, 657 F3d 126, 129 (2d Cir 2011) (“‘[A] defendant seeking severance must show that the prejudice . . . from joinder is sufficiently
severe to outweigh the judicial economy that would be realized by avoiding multiple
lengthy trials.’”), quoting United States v Walker, 142 F3d 103, 110 (2d Cir 1998).
100 Coleman, 22 F3d at 134.
101 Id.
102 Id. See also Part I.B.2.b (discussing the weaknesses of Rule 14).
103 See United States v Edgar, 82 F3d 499, 503 (1st Cir 1996) (considering “whether
the charges are laid under the same statute, whether they involve similar victims, locations, or modes of operation, and the time frame in which the charged conduct occurred”
in determining whether offenses were of the “same or similar character”) (quotation
marks omitted). See also United States v Randazzo, 80 F3d 623, 628 (1st Cir 1996) (holding that “the extent of common evidence” between counts “plays a role in implementing
Rule 8(a)”).
104 See United States v Fattah, 858 F3d 801, 819 (3d Cir 2017); United States v
Thomas, 610 F2d 1166, 1169 (3d Cir 1979) (concluding that thirty-one charges of misapplication of bank funds were of the “same or similar character” because the defendant
“used his position as bank president to . . . misappropriate bank funds” and because “the
various counts involved transactions that all occurred within an eighteen-month period
of time”).
99
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same-or-similar-character prong. These circuits refuse to permit
joinder unless the offenses have some logical connection beyond
a generic similarity in type or class. Although there is some diversity in the factors these courts use to determine whether
charges are of the “same or similar character,” nearly all consider whether the charges joined involve common evidence and
whether the offenses were allegedly committed close in time.
Holistic-approach courts have identified two primary justifications for adopting their respective rules. First, they cite the
controversy surrounding the same-or-similar-character prong,
recognizing that it might not advance joinder’s efficiency justifications while also amplifying the risk of unfair prejudice. Second, they believe a holistic approach better reflects the relative
strengths and weaknesses of Rules 8(a) and 14 to ensure joinder
is available when efficient and fair.
The Ninth Circuit has offered a uniquely developed argument for adopting a holistic rule. In United States v Jawara,109 it
recognized that Rule 8(a) is “phrased in general terms,” but cautioned it is not “infinitely elastic.”110 The court criticized the
Seventh Circuit’s categorical rule as offering “little guidance in
close cases” as “offenses of a ‘like class’ might encompass a host
of otherwise unrelated offenses.”111 Instead, the Ninth Circuit
provided six separate factors to determine from the indictment
whether offenses joined are of the “same or similar character.”112
In addition to ensuring that offenses are of “like class,” the court
explained, it is “appropriate to consider factors such as the
105 See United States v Hawkins, 776 F3d 200, 209 (4th Cir 2009) (deciding that a
carjacking charge and a felon-in-possession charge were not of the “same or similar
character” because, “[w]hile the offenses all involved firearms, albeit different firearms,
nothing ties them together except the defendant. There are no additional factors which
indicate the offenses were ‘identical or strikingly similar’”).
106 See United States v Holloway, 1 F3d 307, 310–11 (5th Cir 1993) (relying on the
facts that the two joined offenses were committed almost two months apart and that different weapons were used during the commission of the two offenses to conclude the offenses were not of the “same or similar character”).
107 See United States v Rodgers, 732 F2d 625, 629 (8th Cir 1984) (holding that “[i]n
applying the ‘same or similar character’ standard, [the] court has allowed the offenses to
be joined when the two counts refer to the same type of offenses occurring over a relatively short period of time, and the evidence as to each count overlaps”) (quotation marks
omitted).
108 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 574.
109 462 F3d 1173 (9th Cir 2006), amended, 474 F3d 565 (9th Cir 2007).
110 Id at 573–74, citing Randazzo, 80 F3d at 627, and United States v Cardwell, 433
F3d 378, 385 (4th Cir 2005).
111 Jawara, 474 F3d at 577.
112 Id at 578.
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elements of the statutory offenses, the temporal proximity of the
acts, the likelihood and extent of evidentiary overlap, the
physical location of the acts, the modus operandi of the crimes,
and the identity of the victims.”113
Though the Jawara court agreed with Coleman that the
joinder inquiry under Rule 8(a) is necessarily more limited in
scope than under Rule 14, it cautioned that “Rule 14 should not
be viewed as a backstop or substitute for the initial analysis required under Rule 8(a).”114 The Ninth Circuit recognized that its
exacting requirements for obtaining Rule 14 severance, together
with the deferential standard by which it reviews district courts’
Rule 14 decisions, make the rule an inherently weak defense
against any resulting prejudice.115
Ultimately, the Jawara court decided that the joined charges at issue were not of the “same or similar character.” The
Government had charged the defendant with “document fraud
related to his personal asylum application and conspiracy to
commit marriage fraud to avoid the immigration laws.”116 Applying its six-factor test, the court explained that the charges
arose under “two different statutory violations requiring proof
of different elements” and from distinct acts “separated by
three-and-a-half years.”117 Additionally, the indictment evinced
neither an “evidentiary link” nor a “similar mode of operation”
between the crimes, and the crimes did not share geographic
locations or victims.118
***
After Coleman and Jawara, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
are split not only over the meaning of Rule 8(a)’s same-orsimilar-character prong but also over the standard for severing
offenses under Rule 14. The Coleman court provided a categorical approach to the same-or-similar-character prong. This allows
for more instances of joinder under Rule 8(a) because the government must meet fewer requirements to join offenses in a single indictment—there is no need to show the offenses are linked
by time or evidence, have similar modi operandi or victims, or
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id at 573.
See Jawara, 474 F3d at 577–78.
Id at 569.
Id at 578.
Id at 579.
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even involve similar statutory elements. To compensate,
Coleman announced a softer standard for Rule 14 that requires
district courts to sever offenses when the potential for unfair
prejudice outweighs any efficiency gains. In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit in Jawara adopted a holistic approach to the same-orsimilar-character prong, making it more difficult for the government to join offenses in the first place under Rule 8(a) while
preserving its requirement that defendants show “manifest
prejudice” before a district court may sever under Rule 14.119 The
two courts therefore employed different strategies toward the
same goal: allowing joinder when justified by efficiencies while
minimizing unfair prejudice to defendants.
C.

The Same-or-Similar-Character Prong in Practice

More than twenty years have passed since the Seventh
Circuit decided Coleman and more than ten years since the
Ninth Circuit decided Jawara. Having set out the rules governing joinder and severance from those decisions, this Section details how their disparate approaches to the same-or-similarcharacter prong have subsequently unfolded.120 The differences
between the holistic and categorical approaches are clearest in
cases in which the charges joined are categorically similar but
differ in other important ways, such as when they arise from
completely separate conduct or involve no temporal or evidentiary overlap. The following case studies demonstrate that it is
generally easier to find offenses of the “same or similar character” under the Seventh Circuit’s categorical “same class” test

119 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 579, citing United States v Lewis, 787 F2d 1318, 1321
(9th Cir 1986).
120 I used Bloomberg Law to search the dockets of each district court within the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits using the search terms “Rule 8,” “Rule 14,” and “sever,” limiting the results to criminal cases decided since September 2006, when the Ninth Circuit
decided Jawara. I reviewed the docket of each case to determine whether either the defendant or the government filed motions contending that the offenses were or were not
properly joined under Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong, or whether the court
decided the offenses had been properly or improperly joined under that prong. For each
of these cases, I analyzed the court’s ruling on the defendant’s motions to sever to determine the final resolution of the issue. This research method finds only cases in which a
motion was filed on this issue or the court’s ruling was memorialized in a written order.
It does not find cases in which the issue of joinder was raised orally and the ruling was
not memorialized in any kind of written order. For the cases located by the search method, see Appendix.
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compared to the Ninth Circuit’s holistic six-factor approach.121
Yet although the holistic and categorical rules often lead to different outcomes, both require that courts sever categorically distinct charges.
Since September 2006, twenty-two district-court cases in
the Seventh Circuit have considered whether offenses were
properly joined under the same-or-similar-character prong. Of
these, courts found the offenses were misjoined in seven cases.
These courts relied on Rule 8(a) to sever categorically distinct
charges, including drug distribution and firearms offenses,122 felon in possession of a firearm and witness intimidation,123 failure
to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act124 and attempting to coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity,125 drug distribution and murder for hire,126 and possession
of child pornography and felon in possession of a firearm.127
In the remaining fifteen cases in which the district courts of
the Seventh Circuit denied Rule 8(a) severance motions, the
courts found the charges to be of “like class,” and thus properly
joined under the same-or-similar-character prong. These courts
permitted joinder even without evidentiary or temporal overlap
between the alleged offenses. In one example, a district court determined a pension plan embezzlement charge and bank fraud
charges were of “similar character,” even though the charges
shared no overlapping evidence and arose from separate conduct
121 To compare the outcomes in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, I chose to focus on
the qualitative aspects of the individual district-court cases rather than the number of
times that courts deny defendants’ motions to sever under Rule 8(a). Not only are there
issues with drawing statistical inferences from small sample sizes, but the circuits’ established joinder rules might influence the decision to bring a Rule 8(a) motion in the
first place. In particular, defendants charged within the Seventh Circuit might decide to
forgo a Rule 8(a) motion because the joined charges are clearly of “like class” under
Coleman, even if they share no temporal or evidentiary similarity. These defendants
might instead focus their resources on arguing for severance under Rule 14, thus decreasing the number of denials of Rule 8(a) motions within the Seventh Circuit. See, for
example, United States v Rollins, 301 F3d 511, 517 (7th Cir 2002).
122 See Order, United States v Broadway, Criminal Action No 12-124, *1 (ND Ind
filed Mar 8, 2013).
123 See Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Sever, United States v
Salinas, Criminal Action No 09-185, *1 (ED Wis filed Sept 25, 2009).
124 Pub L No 109-248, 120 Stat 590 (2006), codified at 42 USC §§ 16901–17.
125 See Decision and Order on Defendant’s Pretrial Motion to Sever Counts, United
States v Williams, Criminal Action No 14-109, *1 (ED Wis filed May 5, 2015).
126 See Decision and Order on Defendant’s Pretrial Motion to Sever Count Eleven,
United States v Ponce De Leon, Criminal Action No 14-197, *1 (ED Wis filed Apr 29, 2015).
127 See Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Sever, United States v
Schneider, Criminal Action No 07-041, *1 (ED Wis filed June 12, 2007).
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fourteen months apart.128 Another court decided that filing a
false tax return and tax evasion were of the “same or similar
character” despite the lack of any temporal or evidentiary relation between the offenses.129
During the same time period, thirty-two district-court cases
in the Ninth Circuit employed the Jawara factors to determine
whether offenses were properly joined under the same-orsimilar-character prong. Courts granted Rule 8(a) motions to
sever in twelve cases. As in the Seventh Circuit, these courts
easily severed categorically distinct charges, such as conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute narcotics charges from money laundering charges130 and a felon-in-possession charge from
securities fraud and identity theft charges.131
These district courts also severed charges under Rule 8(a)
that could arguably be considered of “like class” per Coleman
but were not sufficiently similar under Jawara. For example, a
district court severed two robbery charges despite similar statutory elements, victims, and modi operandi, because they arose
from two separate incidents occurring nearly three years
apart.132 Another court severed chemical weapons charges from
explosive device charges because they derived from incidents
separated by twenty-one months, involved different explosive
mechanisms, and did not share similar victims.133 Likewise, a
court found that various fraud charges were misjoined under
Rule 8(a) as they related to two distinct schemes involving different victims and no evidentiary overlap.134 And while both
schemes resulted in mail and wire fraud charges, only one resulted in additional charges of money laundering and
128 See Order, United States v Peterson, Criminal Action No 12-087, *2–3 (WD Wis
filed Mar 5, 2014) (“Peterson Order”).
129 See Opinion, United States v Fogerson, Criminal Action No 13-20047, *6–7 (CD
Ill filed May 14, 2014) (applying Coleman to decide the charges were “of like class,” because they were “financial crimes involving defrauding the IRS”).
130 See Notice of Motion and Motion for Severance Pursuant to F.R.Crim.P.8(a);
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, United States v Grudzien,
Criminal Action No 13-059, *1, 3 (ND Cal filed Aug 28, 2014).
131 See Final Report and Recommendation regarding Defendant’s Motion to Sever Counts, United States v Freriks, Criminal Action No 10-106, *1–3, 8 (D Alaska
filed Apr 11, 2011).
132 See Order, United States v Kincade, Criminal Action No 15-071, *1–2 (D Nev
filed Oct 21, 2016).
133 See Report and Recommendations, United States v Fries, Criminal Action No 111751, *2 (D Ariz filed Aug 27, 2012).
134 See Order, United States v Sarad, Criminal Action No 11-387, *1–2 (ED Cal
filed Feb 4, 2014).
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transacting in criminally derived property.135 That the elements
of these latter charges differed from those of mail and wire fraud
“weigh[ed] in favor of finding the joinder improper.”136
In the remaining twenty cases, the district courts of the
Ninth Circuit decided that the joined charges were of the “same
or similar character” under Jawara. Charges of transporting a
minor to engage in prostitution, sex trafficking of children, and
enticement of a minor were properly joined, for example, because the evidence of each offense overlapped, they allegedly occurred during the same time period, in the same location, and
involved similar victims.137 Likewise, a district court decided
that bank fraud charges could be joined with charges of willful
misapplication of bank funds.138 Although the charges arose from
separate conduct, the court nonetheless determined that they
were of “similar character”: they involved the same victim, had a
similar modus operandi, and shared overlapping evidence.139
These case studies demonstrate that the divergent approaches taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits result in real
differences in the outcomes of Rule 8(a) severance motions.
While the Coleman and Jawara courts attempted to honor the
same balance between efficiency and fairness, courts in the
Ninth Circuit generally analyze the nexus between the charged
offenses more rigorously under the same-or-similar-character
prong. These courts ask questions aimed at ensuring that joinder can generate real efficiencies for the system while also minimizing the risk of unjustified prejudice toward the defendant.
In contrast, the district courts of the Seventh Circuit decide
merely whether the charges are of “like class” under Rule 8(a),
leaving any balancing of efficiency against fairness for another
day on a motion to sever under Rule 14.
D. Rule 14 Severance in Practice
The Seventh Circuit in Coleman recognized that its permissive joinder rule risked greater prejudice unjustified by any extra efficiency. To avoid this danger, Coleman implored district

135

Id at *4.
Id at *6.
137 See Omnibus Order on Pretrial Motions, United States v Powell, Criminal Action
No 15-244, *15–16 (WD Wash filed Feb 10, 2016).
138 See Memorandum Decision and Order, United States v Teall, Criminal Action No
14-119, *15 (D Idaho filed June 29, 2015).
139 See id.
136
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courts to “not hesitate to order severance” under Rule 14 “if the
risk of real prejudice grows too large to justify whatever
efficiencies a joint trial does provide.”140 The Seventh Circuit
placed its trust in Rule 14 to protect defendants from unjustified
prejudice. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Jawara cited
Rule 14’s procedural and practical difficulties to reinforce its holistic approach to the same-or-similar-character prong.141
Jawara relied on an exhaustive Rule 8(a) analysis to reduce
joinder’s risk of unjustified prejudice and therefore kept intact
its high bar for obtaining Rule 14 severance.142
Ever since, the Ninth Circuit and its district courts have
continued applying an exacting standard for Rule 14 severance,
requiring that defendants show “manifest prejudice.”143 The
Seventh Circuit and its district courts, however, have not been
so consistent. In the immediate wake of Coleman, the Seventh
Circuit continued to apply Coleman’s modified approach to
Rule 14, recognizing that “the risk of unfairness is elevated in a
trial where the joinder of two or more offenses is predicated on
their ‘same or similar character.’” 144 Just a few years later,
though, the wheels began to fall off. In United States v Rollins,145
the defendant was charged with four robbery counts connected
to four separate incidents.146 Though the defendant conceded
that the charges were “of same or similar character” under the
Seventh Circuit’s categorical approach, he argued for Rule 14
severance.147 While Rollins acknowledged Rule 14 tasks the district court with “balancing the cost of multiple trials against the
possible prejudice inherent in a single trial,” the court failed to
recognize, as Coleman did, that this balancing should be skewed

140

Coleman, 22 F3d at 134.
See Jawara, 474 F3d at 573.
142 See id at 579.
143 See, for example, Order, United States v Tapaha, Criminal Action No 12-8177, *2
(D Ariz filed Jan 8, 2014) (“Rule 14 sets a high standard for showing prejudice. . . .
Defendant bears the burden of showing clear, manifest, or undue prejudice of such a
magnitude that, without severance, he will be denied a fair trial.”), citing United States v
Throckmorton, 87 F3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir 1996); Order, United States v Damante, Criminal Action No 11-064, *4 (D Nev filed Sep 8, 2011) (“To prevail on a motion for severance
based on prejudicial joinder, the defendant must demonstrate that without severance he
is unable to receive a fair trial, and that he will suffer actual, compelling prejudice.”);
United States v Mitchell, 502 F3d 931, 963 (9th Cir 2007).
144 United States v Turner, 93 F3d 276, 284 (7th Cir 1996).
145 301 F3d 511 (7th Cir 2002).
146 Id at 513.
147 See id at 517.
141
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in favor of severance when offenses of the “same or similar character” are joined.148
Set in motion by Rollins, the Seventh Circuit’s reversion to
its exacting pre-Coleman Rule 14 standard continued in United
States v Berg,149 which involved the joinder of marijuana and cocaine trafficking charges under the same-or-similar-character
prong.150 There, the court again ignored Coleman’s warning that
the risks of categorical joinder may not be justified by its efficiencies. Instead, Berg relied on a different Seventh Circuit case
not involving the same-or-similar-character prong when it summarily dismissed the defendant’s unfair prejudice arguments.151
“[W]hatever the source of the purported prejudice,” the Berg
court explained, “the defendant bears a heavy burden” of establishing that “denial of severance actually prejudiced him by preventing the jury from arriving at a reliable judgment as to guilt
or innocence.”152 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit has ignored
Coleman’s modification to the Rule 14 standard in cases in
which offenses are categorically joined under the same-orsimilar-character prong, and has instead continued imposing a
“heavy burden” on defendants to show substantial prejudice.153
Unsurprisingly, the Seventh Circuit’s confusion in this area
has led to great inconsistencies at the district-court level. Since
Coleman, there have been nine written orders by district courts
of the Seventh Circuit regarding severing under Rule 14 offenses
categorically joined by the same-or-similar-character prong.
Four of these failed to apply Coleman’s balancing modification.
These courts instead employed the stringent pre-Coleman test
for severance without considering whether joinder was truly justified by efficiency.154

148

Id at 518.
714 F3d 490 (7th Cir 2013).
150 See id at 493–94.
151 See id at 496, citing United States v Ervin, 540 F3d 623, 629 (7th Cir 2008).
Ervin dealt with joinder under Rule 8(a)’s “common scheme or plan” prong, which typically involves substantial evidentiary and temporal overlap because the joined offenses
must be “connected.” Ervin, 540 F3d at 628. See also United States v Davis, 724 F3d 949,
955 (7th Cir 2013). As a result, joinder in these cases more often satisfies its efficiency
purpose and reduces the risk of unfair prejudice.
152 Berg, 714 F3d at 496, quoting Ervin, 540 F3d at 629.
153 See United States v Peterson, 823 F3d 1113, 1124 (7th Cir 2016) (“[T]he defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice by showing that he was unable to obtain a fair
trial.”), citing Ervin, 540 F3d at 629.
154 See Order, United States v Lipford, Criminal Action No 15-167, *3 (ED Wis filed
Feb 22, 2016); Order, United States v Bradford, Criminal Action No 15-30001, *9–10 (SD
149
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In United States v Peterson,155 for example, the Government
charged the defendant in the Western District of Wisconsin with
twelve counts relating to a bank fraud scheme from December
2007: the defendant, the Government alleged, lied to banks to
obtain money in violation of 18 USC §§ 1344 and 1014, and deposited money derived from unlawful activity in violation of 18
USC § 1957.156 Count thirteen of the indictment charged the defendant with violating 18 USC § 664 by unlawfully extracting
money from an employee pension fund in February 2009.157 The
district court first decided that, pursuant to Coleman, the thirteen charges were properly joined under the same-or-similarcharacter prong as each involved the defendant’s “use [of] his
business ventures to obtain money by dishonest means.”158 The
defendant argued, however, that count thirteen should be severed under Rule 14 because the alleged crimes occurred nearly
fourteen months apart and involved different evidence.159 Furthermore, the jury likely would confuse the evidence and be
“more apt to be swayed by the testimony of real people who have
lost their retirement benefits than . . . by impersonal banks that
lost funds.”160 The court denied the Rule 14 severance motion,
explaining only that “[w]ith appropriate instructions, the jury
can be trusted to decide defendant’s guilt or innocence independently on each count.”161 The court neglected to consider any
efficiencies created by joining the offenses or to weigh those
against the risks of prejudice.
In contrast, the remaining five district-court cases applied
Coleman’s refinement of Rule 14 by balancing the efficiencies
gained by joinder against the prejudice posed to the defendant.
In United States v Barker,162 for example, the Government
charged the defendant with two sets of two charges: armed bank
robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.163
Ill filed June 26, 2015); Peterson Order at *3 (cited in note 128); Statement, United
States v Abarca, Criminal Action No 06-575, *1 (ND Ill filed Mar 16, 2007).
155 Peterson Order (cited in note 128).
156 Id at *1.
157 Id at *1–2.
158 Id at *1.
159 Peterson Order at *2–3 (cited in note 128).
160 Id at *3.
161 Id.
162 Order on Defendant’s Motion for Severance and Separate Trials of Counts 1 and
2 from Counts 3 and 4, United States v Barker, Criminal Action No 09-112 (ED Wis filed
July 21, 2009) (“Barker Order”).
163 See id at *1.
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The first set stemmed from an alleged bank robbery in May
2006.164 The second arose from the robbery of a different bank in
a different city in February 2008.165 The district court decided to
sever the two sets of charges under Rule 14 because it found
their joinder “so prejudicial that it outweighs the interests of judicial economy and efficiency.”166 Specifically, “the cumulative effect of hearing the evidence of the defendant’s alleged role in
both bank robberies would be highly prejudicial to the defendant
if both robberies were tried together.”167 And because the evidence proffered in support of each robbery did not overlap, “the
efficiency lost by trying the cases separately would be nominal
when compared with the prejudice to the defendant if the cases
were tried together.”168
Based on these observations, it is clear that court decisions
are affected by which Rule 14 standard they employ; district
courts using the Coleman balancing approach to Rule 14 were
more likely to sever offenses than courts applying the more exacting pre-Coleman standard. Of the five district courts to apply
Coleman’s refinement, two decided that the risk of unfair prejudice was not justified by the efficiencies of a joint trial and severed the charges.169 In the other three cases, the courts found the
defendant had failed to show that prejudice outweighed the efficiencies of a joint trial and, consequently, declined to sever under Rule 14.170 In contrast, each of the four district courts applying the stringent pre-Coleman Rule 14 standard denied
severance.
This difference in outcome may boil down to the mindset of
the judge analyzing the Rule 14 issue. Merely framing the severance question as “Has the defendant shown enough prejudice
to warrant severance?” rather than “Is joinder’s prejudice justified by any efficiency gains?” might cause courts to sever offenses less frequently in similar cases. And because the Seventh

164

See id at *2.
See id at *2–3.
166 Barker Order at *5 (cited in note 162).
167 Id at *6.
168 Id.
169 See Notification of Docket Entry, United States v Zamiar, Criminal Action No
13-929, *1 (ND Ill filed Nov 26, 2014); Barker Order at *5–9 (cited in note 162).
170 See Opinion, United States v Fifer, Criminal Action No 14-30006, *19–23 (CD Ill
filed Oct 23, 2015); Statement, United States v Simmons, Criminal Action No 10-820, *2–
3 (ND Ill filed June 28, 2012); Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v
Kashmiri, Criminal Action No 09-830, *2–4 (ND Ill filed June 7, 2012).
165
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Circuit and its district courts invariably apply the permissive
categorical approach to the same-or-similar-character prong,
they violate not only the careful balance struck by Coleman but
also the principles of Pointer and McElroy that rulemakers explicitly baked into Rules 8(a) and 14.
III. A HOLISTIC SOLUTION TO THE SAME-OR-SIMILAR-CHARACTER
PRONG
Rules 8(a) and 14, according to their drafters, substantially
restate the law on joinder in place before their adoption in
1944.171 At that time, 18 USC § 557 governed the joinder of offenses. As the Supreme Court established in Pointer and
McElroy, that statute incorporated “settled principles of criminal law,” including a general presumption against joinder in
federal prosecutions.172 Pointer recognized joinder’s great risk of
prejudice toward defendants and advised that even when joinder
is appropriate, courts “must not permit the defendant to be embarrassed in his defence.”173 Later, in McElroy, the Court
acknowledged that joinder “has been considered so objectionable
as tending to confound the accused in his defence, or to prejudice
him as . . . being held out to be habitually criminal, in the distraction . . . of the jury.”174 To mitigate these risks, McElroy explained that courts should not allow joint trials on offenses “separate and distinct, complete in themselves and independent of
each other, committed at different times and not provable by the
same evidence.”175
Because Rules 8(a) and 14 have not changed since 1944, the
principles of Pointer and McElroy should continue directing
courts’ joinder and severance inquiries today.176 Courts applying
the rules must be mindful that joining offenses of the “same or
similar character” might prove unfairly prejudicial to defendants, especially when the offenses derive from entirely distinct
conduct with little evidentiary and temporal overlap. Courts
should understand, too, that in these cases the efficiency justifications for joinder are often weaker and might not be sufficiently

171

FRCrP 8(a), Advisory Committee Note to the 1944 Rule.
Pointer, 151 US at 400. See also McElroy, 164 US at 80, quoting Pointer, 151
US at 400.
173 Pointer, 151 US at 403.
174 McElroy, 164 US at 80.
175 Id at 79–80.
176 See note 47 and accompanying text.
172
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compelling to justify the heightened risk of prejudice. To this
end, courts should apply Rules 8(a) and 14 by balancing joinder’s
advantages and disadvantages while keeping in mind the relative strengths and limitations of the two rules in protecting
against unjustified prejudice.
The reverberations of Pointer’s and McElroy’s admonitions
were heard in both Coleman and Jawara. The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits recognized the dangers of joining offenses under
the same-or-similar-character prong and established two divergent systems to account for its inherent problems. By adjusting
their respective standards under Rules 8(a) and 14, the two
courts sought to ensure charges are joined only when doing so is
efficient and fair.
The Seventh Circuit adopted a categorical approach to the
same-or-similar-character prong but recognized that this might
prejudice defendants without a concomitant increase in efficiency. Thus, Coleman announced a more lenient standard for severance under Rule 14, requiring lower courts to sever offenses
when joinder’s costs outweigh its benefits. It attempted to strike
a careful balance between efficiency and fairness by making
Rule 14 severance more accessible in response to its permissive
joinder standard for Rule 8(a).
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit in Jawara announced a holistic approach to the same-or-similar-character prong and required lower courts to apply six separate factors before allowing
joinder. Satisfied with this approach’s fairness, which restricts
the government’s ability to join offenses from the start, the
Ninth Circuit left in place its exacting requirement that defendants seeking Rule 14 severance show “manifest prejudice” from
the joinder.177
As the case studies in Parts II.C and II.D show, Coleman’s
attempt to create an efficient and fair system of joinder has
failed. The Seventh Circuit’s categorical approach allows more
combinations of offenses joined under the same-or-similarcharacter prong compared to the holistic approach.178 This difference is most apparent when the government joins similar
statutory charges in a single indictment but the underlying
crimes share few other similarities, whether in evidence, time,
location, modus operandi, or victim. In fact, under the
177 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 579, citing United States v Lewis, 787 F2d 1318, 1321
(9th Cir 1986).
178 See Part II.C.
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categorical approach, even violations of entirely different statutes can be joined depending on the level of abstraction taken by
the court in judging the similarities between the offenses.179
Critically, the Seventh Circuit’s approach does not always
advance joinder’s traditional justifications of judicial and prosecutorial economy. When categorically joined charges are proven
with different bodies of evidence and separate witnesses, the
time and resources saved by a joint trial are less obvious. At the
same time, categorical joinder comes with far greater risks of
unfair prejudice toward the defendant. In these cases, jurors see
and hear evidence relating to the multiple charges. If strong evidence supports an inference of guilt on one charge, the jury
might be inclined to look past weaker evidence on the other
charges, inferring that if the defendant is guilty of one crime, he
is also guilty of the others. The defendant might be prejudiced,
too, simply by having multiple charges against him. The jury
could conclude the defendant has a criminal character or propensity to commit crime, an inference against which the Federal
Rules of Evidence protect.180
The Seventh Circuit’s trust in Rule 14 has also proven misguided. Coleman pointed to the availability of Rule 14 severance
to justify its permissive understanding of the same-or-similarcharacter prong. The court believed that Rule 14 could function
as a safety valve, authorizing severance in the face of unjustified
prejudice. Yet Coleman’s ideal of trial judges severing offenses
whenever the risk of prejudice outweighs joinder’s efficiency
benefits has not materialized, which is perhaps inevitable given
Rule 14’s inherent weaknesses.181 Not only have district courts
inconsistently applied Coleman’s lower standard for severance,
the Seventh Circuit itself has reverted to imposing a greater burden on defendants petitioning under Rule 14.182 In turn, this leads
courts to sever fewer offenses, even when the defendant can point
to concrete examples of joinder’s prejudice.183 Thus, by

179 See, for example, Peterson Order at *1 (cited in note 128) (deciding that charged
violations of 18 USC §§ 664, 1014, 1344, and 1957 were of “similar character,” as each
involved the defendant’s “use [of] his business ventures to obtain money by dishonest
means”).
180 See FRE 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted
in accordance with the character.”).
181 See Part II.D. See also Part I.B.2.b.
182 See Part II.D.
183 See Part II.D.
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permissively joining charges under the same-or-similar-character
prong while raising higher barriers to Rule 14 severance, approaches like the Seventh Circuit’s virtually ensure that there
will be instances in which joinder creates substantial prejudice
with little or no efficiency gains.
To remedy these problems and avoid the Seventh Circuit’s
failures, categorical-approach courts should instead employ a
holistic approach to the same-or-similar-character prong by requiring that joined offenses be connected by at least evidence
and time. This solution conforms to the drafters’ characterization of Rules 8(a) and 14 as “substantially a restatement of existing law,”184 as well as the Supreme Court’s prohibition on the
joinder of offenses “committed at different times, and not provable by the same evidence.”185 Furthermore, Rule 8(a)’s drafters
purposely replaced the “same class of crimes”186 language from
the former joinder statute with the phrase “same or similar
character” so that courts focus on the nature of the offenses
joined rather than their degree or grading as either misdemeanor or felony.187 If the Court in Pointer and McElroy believed that
the 1853 statute’s “same class of crimes” language required offenses be connected by time and evidence, then surely the sameor-similar-character prong demands at least as much.
The holistic approach comports with this understanding by
permitting joinder only when the offenses are at least related in
time and by evidence.188 This better reflects the general presumption against joinder embodied in Rules 8(a) and 14 and fulfills the principles of Pointer and McElroy by reducing the risk
that defendants will suffer unfair and unjustified prejudice in
criminal trials. The holistic approach also ensures that offenses
are joined when the efficiency justifications are strongest, such
as when evidence of the crimes overlaps, and guards against unfair prejudice by requiring offenses to be more closely related.
In addition, the holistic approach’s focus on a series of factors to determine the “same or similar character” better guides
lower courts’ application of Rule 8(a) and leads to more consistent results.189 Jawara’s six factors constitute concrete

184
185
186
187
188
189

FRCrP 8(a), Advisory Committee Note to 1944 Rule.
McElroy, 164 US at 79–80.
Act of Feb 26, 1853, 10 Stat at 162.
See Orfield, 26 FRD at 26–27 (cited in note 55).
See Part II.B.
See Wright, et al, 1A Federal Practice & Procedure § 143 at 43 (cited in note 54).
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requirements for joinder compared to Coleman’s ill-defined
concept of “like class.”190 Consequently, it is easier for district
courts to decide whether the offenses are connected by time or
evidence without having to be concerned about the proper level
of generality to find any thematic connection between the
joined charges.
What’s more, the holistic approach more closely reflects the
relative strengths and weaknesses of Rules 8(a) and 14 to effectively counter joinder’s prejudice. Because the holistic-approach
courts employ a more rigorous application of the same-orsimilar-character prong that results in fewer combinations of
charges joined, they need not be as concerned that Rule 8(a)
joinder will cause unfairness. As a result, the holistic-approach
courts are able to maintain a high standard for defendants seeking to sever under Rule 14. This avoids Rule 14’s inherent
weaknesses in protecting against unjustified prejudice, including the broad discretion enjoyed by district-court judges applying the rule. As the experience in the Seventh Circuit
demonstrates, even when defendants can show that joinder
causes substantial prejudice, district courts may order alternative remedies to severance, such as imploring the jury not to
draw impermissible inferences about the defendant’s criminal
character.191 Likewise, the holistic approach’s relatively greater
reliance on Rule 8(a) reduces the likelihood that the sunk-cost
fallacy will affect the district-court judge’s decision to sever, because the Rule 8(a) joinder determination is made at the beginning of the case and based solely on the indictment’s contents.192
Compared to the categorical approach, the holistic approach
better incorporates the principles of Pointer and McElroy embodied in Rules 8(a) and 14, is more likely to allow joinder only
when justified by real efficiency gains, and better reflects the
comparative strengths and weaknesses of the rules in preventing unjustified prejudice against criminal defendants. The holistic approach is therefore superior to the categorical alternative
and authorizes joinder only when efficient and fair.

190 The Jawara court predicted that, depending on the level of abstraction, absurdities can result in finding obviously dissimilar offenses are of “like class.” See Jawara,
474 F3d at 579.
191 See Part II.D.
192 See note 76 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Joinder of offenses against a single defendant is a controversial mechanism in the federal system. Especially contentious
is joinder under Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong, as
it may create a greater risk of unfair prejudice toward the defendant without accompanying efficiency gains. It is therefore
troubling that the federal courts are deeply split over how to determine whether offenses can be joined under this prong.
Courts taking a categorical approach to the same-or-similarcharacter prong should instead employ a holistic approach. By
permissively joining offenses under the same-or-similarcharacter prong while making it difficult to later sever under
Rule 14, the categorical-approach courts violate the Supreme
Court precedent embodied in the federal rules. Pointer and
McElroy instructed that joinder should be sustained only when
offenses are connected in some tangible evidentiary way, such as
involving the same evidence and temporal overlap, and when defendants will not be unfairly prejudiced as a result. The solution
offered here conforms to the drafters’ intent to preserve in the
rules the principles established by Pointer and McElroy, properly accounts for the procedural and practical realities of the rules,
and allows joinder only when justified by the efficiencies it affords. This solution ensures that the joinder of similar offenses
is available when it serves its legitimate purpose but will not
needlessly expose criminal defendants to excessive prejudice.
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APPENDIX
I used Bloomberg Law to search the dockets of each district
court within the Seventh and Ninth Circuits using the search
terms “Rule 8,” “Rule 14,” and “sever,” limiting the results to
criminal cases decided since September 2006, when the Ninth
Circuit decided Jawara. I reviewed the docket of each case to determine whether either the defendant or the government filed
motions contending that the offenses were or were not properly
joined under Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong, or
whether the court decided the offenses had been properly or improperly joined under that prong. For each of these cases, I
analyzed the court’s ruling on the defendant’s motions to sever
to determine the final resolution of the issue. Tables 1 and 2
consolidate the results for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits respectively. This research method finds only cases in which a motion was filed on this issue or the court’s ruling was memorialized in a written order. It does not find cases in which the issue
of joinder was raised orally and the ruling was not memorialized
in any kind of written order.
TABLE 1. SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES

Case
United States v Lipford, Criminal Action No
15-167 (ED Wis filed Feb 22, 2016)
United States v Fifer, Criminal Action No 1430006 (CD Ill filed Oct 23, 2015)
United States v Carpenter, Criminal Action
No 13-930 (ND Ill filed July 30, 2015)
United States v Williams, Criminal Action No
14-109 (ED Wis filed May 5, 2015)
United States v Ponce De Leon, Criminal Action No 14-197 (ED Wis filed Apr 29, 2015)
United States v Bradford, Criminal Action No
15-30001 (SD Ill filed June 26, 2015)
United States v Anderson, Criminal Action
No 14-186 (ED Wis filed Apr 29, 2015)
United States v DiCosola, Criminal Action No
12-446 (ND Ill filed Aug 14, 2014)
United States v Fogerson, Criminal Action No
13-20047 (CD Ill filed May 14, 2014)

Misjoinder
under Sameor-SimilarCharacter
Prong?

Severance
under
Rule 14?

Denied

Denied

Not raised

Denied

Denied

Not raised

Granted

N/A

Granted

N/A

Denied

Denied

Denied

Not raised

Denied

Granted

Denied

Denied
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Case
United States v Zamiar, Criminal Action No
13-929 (ND Ill filed Dec 3, 2013)
United States v Broadway, Criminal Action
No 12-124 (ND Ind filed Mar 8, 2013)
United States v Jenkins, Criminal Action No
12-34 (ED Wis filed Aug 15, 2012)
United States v Simmons, Criminal Action
No 10-820 (ND Ill filed June 28, 2012)
United States v Tolbert, Criminal Action No
11-186 (ED Wis filed Feb 7, 2012)
United States v Kashmiri, Criminal Action
No 09-830 (ND Ill filed Jan 25, 2011)
United States v Salinas, Criminal Action No
09-185 (ED Wis filed Sept 25, 2009)
United States v Barker, Criminal Action No
09-112 (ED Wis filed July 21, 2009)
United States v Rogers, Criminal Action No
06-540 (ND Ill filed Feb 29, 2008)
United States v Schneider, Criminal Action
No 07-041 (ED Wis filed June 12, 2007)
United States v Guillen, Criminal Action No
06-360 (ND Ill filed May 23, 2007)
United States v Abarca, Criminal Action No
06-575 (ND Ill filed Mar 16, 2007)
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Misjoinder
under Sameor-SimilarCharacter
Prong?

Severance
under
Rule 14?

Denied

Granted

Granted

Granted

Granted

N/A

Denied

Denied

Denied

Not raised

Denied

Denied

Granted

N/A

Denied

Granted

Not raised

Denied

Granted

N/A

Not raised

Denied

Denied

Denied
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TABLE 2. NINTH CIRCUIT CASES

Case
United States v Kincade, Criminal Action No
15-71 (D Nev filed Oct 21, 2016)
United States v King, Criminal Action No 143537 (SD Cal filed Mar 14, 2016)
United States v Powell, Criminal Action No
15-244 (WD Wash filed Feb 10, 2016)
United States v Kimmell, Criminal Action No
14-54 (D Nev filed Nov 9, 2015)
United States v Drago, Criminal Action No
13-334 (D Nev filed Oct 26, 2015)
United States v Handl, Criminal Action No
15-126 (ND Cal filed Aug 25, 2015)
United States v Teall, Criminal Action No 14119 (D Idaho filed June 29, 2015)
United States v Tillisy, Criminal Action No
13-310 (WD Wash filed Nov 14, 2014)
United States v Grudzien, Criminal Action
No 13-59 (ND Cal filed Aug 28, 2014)
United States v Hill, Criminal Action No 13765 (ND Cal filed July 24, 2014)
United States v Rachell, Criminal Action No
14-25 (D Mont filed June 19, 2014)
United States v Halgat, Criminal Action No
13-239 (D Nev filed June 13, 2014)
United States v Alcaraz, Criminal Action No
13-189 (D Nev filed May 20, 2014)
United States v Taplin, Criminal Action No
13-266 (D Or filed Feb 10, 2014)
United States v Sarad, Criminal Action No
11-387 (ED Cal filed Feb 4, 2014)
United States v Tapaha, Criminal Action No
12-8177 (D Ariz filed Jan 8, 2014)
United States v LaFarga, Criminal Action No
13-85 (D Nev filed Dec 30, 2013)

Misjoinder
under Sameor-SimilarCharacter
Prong?

Severance
under
Rule 14?

Granted

N/A

Denied

Denied

Denied

Denied

Denied

Denied

Denied

Denied

Granted

N/A

Denied

Denied

Denied

Denied

Granted

N/A

Granted

N/A

Denied

Denied

Granted

N/A

Denied

Denied

Granted

N/A

Granted

N/A

Denied

Denied

Granted

Denied
(incorrectly
applied the
law)
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Case
United States v Walton, Criminal Action No
12-311 (D Nev filed Dec 6, 2013)
United States v Musso, Criminal Action No
12-273 (D Nev filed Oct 1, 2013)
United States v Ruby, Criminal Action No 121073 (SD Cal filed Feb 12, 2013)
United States v Vales, Criminal Action No
11-434 (D Nev filed Jan 4, 2013)
United States v Fries, Criminal Action No 111751 (D Ariz filed Aug 27, 2012)
United States v Salyer, Criminal Action No
10-61 (ED Cal filed Dec 12, 2011)
United States v Quesada, Criminal Action No
11-8088 (D Ariz filed Dec 1, 2011)
United States v Damante, Criminal Action
No 11-64 (D Nev filed Sept 8, 2011)
United States v Freriks, Criminal Action No
10-106 (D Alaska filed Apr 11, 2011)
United States v Walizer, Criminal Action No
10-124 (D Nev filed Dec 30, 2010)
United States v Schmit, Criminal Action No
07-1714 (D Ariz filed Dec 14, 2010)
United States v Brown, Criminal Action No
09-8067 (D Ariz filed July 13, 2010)
United States v Nejbauer, Criminal Action
No 09-670 (D Ariz filed Nov 2, 2009)
United States v Cerna, Criminal Action No
08-730 (ND Cal filed Sept 16, 2009)
United States v Feliciano, Criminal Action
No 08-932 (D Ariz filed Aug 5, 2009)
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Misjoinder
under Sameor-SimilarCharacter
Prong?

Severance
under
Rule 14?

Not raised

Granted

Denied

Not raised

Denied

Not raised

Not raised

Granted

Granted

N/A

Granted

N/A

Not raised

Granted

Denied

Denied

Granted

N/A

Not raised

Denied

Denied

Denied

Not raised

Denied

Not raised

Denied

Granted

N/A

Not raised

Denied

